Emergencies and the use of unorganized volunteers. Experiences from Tromsø by Skar, Marit Synnøve Olsen
 
  
Department of Engineering Science and Safety of the University of Tromsø 
Emergencies and the use of unorganized volunteers 
Experiences from Tromsø 
 
Marit Skar 
Master thesis in Societal Safety 13
th
 July 2014 
 
Table of contents 
 
Table of Contents 
 
Acknowledgments ....................................................................................................................... i 
Summary ................................................................................................................................... iii 
Personal motivation .................................................................................................................... v 
1  Introduction ........................................................................................................................ 1 
1.1  Background and problem ....................................................................................................... 1 
1.2 Research on unorganized volunteerism in emergencies .......................................................... 3 
1.3 Research purpose ..................................................................................................................... 6 
1.4 Structure of the thesis .............................................................................................................. 6 
2 Theoretical framework ........................................................................................................ 8 
2.1 Organizations and their environments ..................................................................................... 8 
2.2 Boundary spanning .................................................................................................................. 9 
2.3 Institutional logics ................................................................................................................. 10 
2.4 Analytical implication ........................................................................................................... 12 
3 Methodology ..................................................................................................................... 14 
3.1 Interview ................................................................................................................................ 14 
3.2 Textual analysis ..................................................................................................................... 17 
3.3 Research robustness .............................................................................................................. 19 
3.3.1 Reliability ...................................................................................................................... 19 
3.3.2  Validity .......................................................................................................................... 20 
3.3.3 Ensuring reliability and validity .................................................................................... 20 
3.4 Challenges ............................................................................................................................. 21 
3.5 Limitations............................................................................................................................. 21 
3.6 Ethics ..................................................................................................................................... 22 
4 Findings ............................................................................................................................. 23 
4.1 Formal rules of action ............................................................................................................ 23 
4.1.1 Laws, procedural handbooks and checklists .................................................................. 23 
4.1.2 Contingency plans ......................................................................................................... 26 
4.1.3 Training and exercises ................................................................................................... 28 
4.1.4 Challenges in the use of unorganized volunteers .......................................................... 30 
4.1.5 Summary ....................................................................................................................... 32 
4.2 Informal practices .................................................................................................................. 34 
Table of contents 
 
4.2.1 Personal experiences and perceptions ........................................................................... 34 
4.2.2 Internal discussions among colleagues .......................................................................... 38 
4.2.3 Challenges in the use of unorganized volunteers .......................................................... 40 
4.2.4 Summary of informal practices ..................................................................................... 41 
4.3 Summary ............................................................................................................................... 43 
5.0 Discussion ......................................................................................................................... 46 
6.0 Conclusion ........................................................................................................................ 50 
6.1 Contribution........................................................................................................................... 50 
6.2 Practical implications ............................................................................................................ 51 
6.3 Issues for further research ..................................................................................................... 52 
References ................................................................................................................................ 53 





Writing this paper has been time consuming. Curiosity started the process, which evolved into 
an idea, and eventually materialized as a finished product. Admittedly there have been some 
frustrations, many “a-ha”, trials and errors, and digging into a subject that I find exiting and 
interesting. In retrospective I believe that the result gave itself. However, along the way there 
have been doubts and I certainly have been lost on occasions. Thankfully I have had access to 
knowledgeable people around me that have listened, given me invaluable feedback as well as 
inspired me to carry on. 
This paper is not only a result of six months writing, but instead a product of two years study 
at the Institute of Technology and Safety in the High North.  
I would like to thank my fellow students at the faculty. It has been a pleasure working with 
you as part of a team and participate in interesting discussions of the subject matter. 
Thank you to the lecturers that passionately have shared their knowledge and thanks to the 
faculty that contains so much knowledge and competency.  
A special thanks to my fellow student Maria Eknes for fruitful and interesting discussions. 
You were invaluable as a sparring partner when preparing for exams, when the progress was 
slow and motivation lacking. 
Thanks to my lovely children and boyfriend who supported me in times of stress and pressure. 
Thanks to my employer that gave me leave of absence when preparing for my exams. 
Finally, thanks to my supervisors Andreas and Maria. Andreas; you have provided explicit 
and valuable feedback that have contributed greatly to this thesis. Maria; you inspire me! 
Your knowledge, skills, precision and ability to see things clearly have not only been a great 
help, but in fact of vital importance for me being able to finish this study! Thank you both for 











If disaster strikes, people who are nearby will very often contribute in the emergency 
response. Emergency responders will have to interact with unorganized volunteers. However, 
research on unorganized volunteers in emergencies has paid little attention on how to best 
utilize the average citizen. To contribute to better understanding of the interaction between 
actors present in emergencies we need to understand the relation between emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers at the scene. This thesis seeks to add to this 
knowledge, by providing insight into the interaction between emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers.  
The thesis has applied qualitative method. Interviews and additional textual analysis has 
proved fruitful when studying the interaction between emergency response agencies and 
unorganized volunteers. The study is limited to the community of Tromsø.  
The interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers on the scene are 
not random.  In order to analyze the interaction between emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers the study has applied institutional logics as an analytical approach. 
Institutional logics emphasize the powerful and adaptive role of norms, values and beliefs in 
the process of organizational development. While interacting with their environment (i.e. 
professional emergency responders and unorganized volunteers) organizational actors rely on 
both formal and informal frameworks. Organizations provide formal rules of action and 
informal practices to the actors within an organization. These aspects may facilitate or 
constraint action, and determine where the attention of organizational actors is directed.  
The main finding in this study is that emergency response agencies lack formal practices on 
how to best utilize unorganized volunteers. Nevertheless, the average citizens are participating 
in emergency response “every day”, due to informal practices held by emergency responders.   









The main reason for choosing this topic was personal interest. I became interested after I 
participated as a marker in a large scale exercise in Tromsø. All emergency rescue teams 
where present, including the police, the fire brigade and the paramedics. There were also 
organized voluntary groups, like The Norwegian civil defense (sivilforsvaret) and Norwegian 
people aid (Norsk folkehjelp). All markers were supposed to have minor injuries, and act as 
we would have done if this was a real situation. We quickly started to take care of people that 
were severely injured. In other words we were acting as unorganized volunteers. The scene 
was very realistic, with smoke, paramedics running in and out of the building, sirens, and 
even a helicopter landing outside. The paramedics with lifesaving tasks where, not 
surprisingly, stressed and overloaded. I observed that the rescuers never asked us to help them 
with practical issues. There were a lot of tasks that could easily have been delegated to the 
markers (unorganized volunteers) like carrying stretchers, getting blankets for patients or 
clear the evacuation route for obstacles, so that the evacuation would go smoother. The 
question that suggested itself was why emergency respondent didn`t utilize us 









“Citizen response is what saves the day when disaster strike.”  
(Helseloot and Ruitenberg, 2004:110) 
 
 
1  Introduction 
1.1  Background and problem    
 
In emergency situations people who are nearby often contribute as unorganized volunteers 
(Helseloot and Ruitenberg 2004:98; Auf der Heide 2004:350-354; Tierney 2003:36). Citizens’ 
being first on a scene start lifesaving activities, help victims evacuate, give emotional support 
and offer other practical help (Helseloot and Ruitenberg 2004:98; Auf der Heide 2004:350-
354, Dynes 1990, Tierney 2003:36, NOU 2012:14). This is part of a phenomenon referred to 
as convergence
1
 (Barsky et al. 2007:495). Emergencies may be manmade (such as terrorism), 
caused by technical failure, or natural disasters (Rosenthal et.al 2001:10). Nevertheless, 
people offer equipment and give support in different ways (Auf der Heide 2004:350-354; 
NOU 2012:14). People want to help. Such altruism goes beyond gender, age and culture
2
. 
There are countless examples worldwide on such volunteering activity (Auf der Heide 2004: 
350-354, Tierney 2003:36, Ursano et al. 1994:255), and there is no reason to believe citizens 
will stop offering help in catastrophes in the future.  Yet, literature provides little advice on 
how professional responders can benefit from unorganized volunteerism.  
Helseloot and Ruitenberg (2004:109) claim that governments should step in to improve 
citizens’ response by preparing to facilitate it in times of disaster. Norwegian crisis 
management is based on different principles (The contingency plan for the police, part 1). 
These principles are the principle of subsidiarity (nærhetsprinsippet), the principle of 
responsibility (ansvarsprinsippet), the principle of similarity (likhetsprinsippet) and the 
principle of cooperation (samvirkeprinsippet). The latter principle implies extensive 
                                                          
1
 Convergence is a broad phenomenon referring to the occurrence of people, probably in large scale, that most 
likely will show up hours before organized volunteering groups in emergency situations (Barsky et.al 2007:495). 
2
 Even though, Helseloot and Ruitenberg claim that further research on cultural differences in emergency 
response is needed (2004:110). 
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coordination and cooperation between public services, local administrations and voluntary 
organizations. The principle must be implemented in the plans, routines and procedures for all 
organizations that participate according to this principle (The contingency plan of the police, 
part 1). The importance of training and exercises involving all parties is emphasized (ibid).   
The principle of subsidiarity in crisis management implies a decentralized form of 
organization where decisions and actions for handling of the crisis or disaster are taken at the 
lowest organizational level practical. This means that a crisis within a municipality or county 
will be handled by units within the local administration. In this respect it is important to take 
the emergency response by unorganized volunteers into consideration (Kruke 2012:10). In 
“the golden hour” of crisis, unorganized volunteers will be an important resource (Kruke 
2012:10).  
Table 1. Actors in emergencies and their functions (Kruke 2012:11): 
Actors Phase Responsibility 
The affected/injured “The Golden Hour” Save themselves and others 
Unorganized volunteers “The Golden Hour” (+) Lifesaving activities 
Professional emergency 
responders 
Acute phase (30 min+) Take command and crisis 
management  
Organized volunteers Acute phase (1h+) Procedures and planned tasks 
 
Every actor in an emergency has its function (see table 1). Adequate aid in the first hour of an 
emergency may be the difference between life and death for severely injured people 
(Helseloot and Ruitenberg, 2004:106; Procedural handbook for the ambulance service). 
Citizens will have to rely on themselves and/or be dependent on aid from unorganized 
volunteers (Helseloot and Ruitenberg 2004:106, Kruke 2012:11). 
The Norwegian Directorate for Civil protection
 
claims all resources must be mapped prior to 
an undesirable event (www.dsb.no), yet few professional emergency responders include 
unorganized volunteers as a resource in their contingency plans (Procedural handbook for the 
ambulance service, Contingency plans for search and rescue for the Red Cross). Besides, 
there is little research conceptualizing how to utilize this massive crowd, willing to help. 
Citizens are a resource in many ways; they are a source of information about local area and 
the event sequence, and starts lifesaving activities (Kruke 2012). A brilliant example of the 
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valuable aid provided by unorganized volunteers is the emergency response during the 
terrorist attack 22th of July, 2011, in Oslo (NOU 2012:14). The professional emergency 
agencies received invaluable assistance from both organized and unorganized volunteers 
(ibid). In addition to the above mentioned principles, there is an assumption that no sector in 
Norwegian society may handle a huge crisis alone, making Norwegian crisis management 
dependent on volunteering aid from citizens (Kruke 2012:10)
3
. People are a resource in crisis. 
“Contingency plans, preparedness, training and exercises, therefore, should reflect on the 
capacity of people”. (Kruke 2012:16). 
In order to manage crisis there is a lot of planning and preparedness (Perry and Lindell 2003). 
Contingency plans are written and exercises are conducted in accordance to the written plan 
(ibid). Different scenarios are discussed in tabletop exercises, and large scale exercises 
involving all emergency response organizations are being held (Perry 2004). Evaluation is 
done, and hopefully lessons are learned from both training and exercises (Kruke 2012). 
However, volunteers willing to contribute labor in the emergency response are often 
overlooked in planning (Dynes 1990). The emergency response should emphasize on 
effectively utilizing and mobilizing volunteers (ibid).  So far, however, little attention has 
been paid to explore how unorganized volunteers can be included in contingency plans in 
order to utilize them to the best of their ability (Dynes 1990). More information about the 
interaction between unorganized volunteers and emergency responders on the site would help 
us to establish more knowledge on this matter. There is limited knowledge in disaster and 
emergency response literature on how to utilize unorganized volunteers. My thesis intends to 
contribute with knowledge in this field. 
1.2 Research on unorganized volunteerism in emergencies  
Different terms are used in literature to discuss unorganized volunteers. Unorganized 
volunteers are referred to as helpers (Fritz and Mathewson 1957; from Barsky et. al 
2007:496), unaffiliated responders (Barsky et.al. 2007:495), volunteers (Drabek, 2010:135) 
and unofficial volunteers (Barsky et al. 2007:496). 
Numerous studies have described unorganized volunteerism (Dynes 2002; Wachtendorf & 
Kendra 2004, Auf der Heide 2004, Tierny 2003). Citizens bring themselves to safety, and 
save fellow citizens, in disaster (Helseloot and Ruitenberg 2004:110). Unorganized volunteers 
can be used as a source of information and as helpers for practical assistance (Johansson 
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 Refered to as Dugnadsprinsippet 
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2013:3). However, studies show that volunteering contribution in emergencies is not 
exclusively positive (Barsky et al. 2007:495). Barsky et al. discuss the paradox that volunteers 
on the scene pose the risk of being both a potential help, but also a hindrance (Barsky et 
al.2007:495) Through in-depth interviews with members of the Urban Search and Rescue 
(US&R) the study map different ways of interacting with, and utilizing volunteers. Volunteers 
are being assessed in terms of their presumed legitimacy, utility and potential liability or 
danger posed during the disaster response (ibid). The arrival of people showing up on the 
scene is ranging from professionals to untrained, well-meaning individuals. Emergency 
managers are enforced to deal with these responders. Concluding remarks from the authors 
suggest that there is no correct answer on how to best make use of volunteers in disaster 
response. 
Dynes (1990) discusses the problematic assumptions rooted in conventional emergency 
planning. He stresses a distrust of independent action by volunteers, not anticipated in the pre-
emergency planning (Dynes 1990:11). The effective use of volunteers depends on 
considerations being built into contingency planning for their utilization (Dynes 1990:21-22). 
Volunteers are a supplemental emergency response resource, and may perform a number of 
tasks, like search and rescue (Dynes 1990). In sum, he suggests a problem solving model for 
emergency response, rather than traditional command- and control model, based on a top 
down approach to crisis management. The problem solving model assumes that the citizens 
are relevant and capable in emergencies. Thus the primary focus in emergency planning 
should focus on the development of mechanisms and techniques of coordination which will 
allow an effective response on the part of the organizational resources in the community, 
emphasizing effective utilization of unorganized volunteers (Dynes 1990:23-27). 
Drabek (2010) claim volunteers must be integrated into the overall disaster response. If this is 
not done efficiently, they may become a source of problem rather than a resource (ibid). 
Authorities have neglected the possibilities and advantages of citizens` response (Helseloot 
and Ruitenberg 2004:110). It is necessary to take into account the possibilities of citizen 
response, as disaster plans generally approach a citizen as a helpless victim, who can only be 
helped by the appropriate services (ibid). Current contingency plans tend to perceive citizens as a 
problem rather than a resource (Dynes 1990:5). Instead of contingency plans based on the 
traditionally three C´s (Chaos, Command and Control), Helseloot and Ruitenberg (2004) 
agree with Dynes (1990). Dynes suggests to replace the traditional C´s with Continuity, Co-
ordination and Co-operation (Helseloot and Ruitenberg 2004). The latter model, termed the 
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problem-solving or human resources model is based on the idea that successful crisis 
management is flexible, adaptive and decentralized. 
Whether to use a “command and control” approach to crisis management, or the bottom-up 
approach based on coordination and cooperation (Helseloot and Ruitenberg 2004:104), is a 
topic of discussion (Tierny 2003:39).  Research suggests that emergency plans should be 
based on principles, rather than specific details. In this way, contingency plans encourage 
both communities and rescue teams to improvisation (Perry and Lindell 2003:342-343). There 
are several examples on successful improvisation (Weick 1993, Auf der Heide 2004; Tierny 
2003). Nevertheless, crisis management often relies on the traditional “command and control” 
principles because planners believe people will react to crisis in an unsocial way and need to 
be controlled (Tierny 2003:19).  
Auf der Heide emphasizes that contingency plans must conform to the actual behavior of 
people on a disaster site (Auf der Heide 2004:364). He argues that communities are resilient 
and do not suffer social breakdown in disasters. He argues against common misconceptions 
about disaster behavior, such as “the panic misconception”, the hesitancy to evacuate, the 
“disaster syndrome” and the “looting misconception”. These “myths” of social behavior are 
often held by planners (Auf der Heide 2004:342- 362). Unfortunately, these misconceptions 
can lead to dysfunctional planning. “Disaster planning is only as good as the assumptions 
upon which it is based” (Ibid, p.364). 
Another issue that has been addressed recently is patterns of interaction between professional 
emergency responders and unorganized volunteers on the incident site (Johansson 2013). He 
found that all of the studied emergency responders (the police, fire- and rescue services and 
the paramedics) regarded the unaffiliated helpers as a resource in two respects: to be used for 
practical assistance, and as a source of information. The study examines how unorganized 
volunteers are being utilized on the site an emergency: ambulance personnel used unaffiliated 
helpers for non-treatment tasks, like carrying stretchers, holding hands- and talking to injured 
people. The police demanded assistance from unaffiliated helpers, regarding information and 
the fire and rescue needed unorganized volunteers for carrying stuff and other practical issues. 
Unorganized volunteers were recognized for selfless and outstanding aid in rescuing victims 
in the emergency response during the terrorist attack in Oslo, 2011 (NOU 2012:14 p. 202-
203). Unorganized volunteers gave first aid, offered warm clothing, blankets and showers; 
they evacuated youth, warned emergency agencies and provided care in different ways. The 
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commission emphasis what “an enormous resource the average citizen is in disaster” 
(NOU2012:14). Nevertheless, the report gives no recommendations for further focus on how 
to utilize unorganized volunteers in emergency.  
If disaster strikes, people who are nearby will most likely contribute in the emergency 
response. Professional emergency responders and organized volunteers will have to interact 
and cooperate with unorganized volunteers. The intention of this study is to shed light on 
what allocate the attention of emergency responders in emergencies, and what rules do they 
conceive as appropriate to the situation they are facing regarding unorganized volunteers. It 
may be interesting to explore if the potential for utilizing unorganized volunteers are greater.  
1.3 Research purpose 
There is limited knowledge in disaster and emergency response literature on how to interact 
with and utilize unorganized volunteers. My thesis intends to contribute with knowledge in 
this field. In order to address the topic, two research questions were formulated: 
1. How do emergency response organizations interact with unorganized volunteers 
through formal and informal means? 
2. What factors facilitate and constraint interaction between professional emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers?  
Empirically, this study will contribute with knowledge on the interaction between emergency 
response organizations and unorganized volunteers in Tromsø. The data focuses on the 
emergency response organizations.  The interaction on site is highlighted through the lenses 
of the emergency response organizations, not unorganized volunteers. As such, the study has 
an organizational point of view. 
In terms of theory, the study will test the applicability of analytical approaches studying the 
institutional logics to the analysis of the interaction between emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers.  
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
This thesis has been divided into six chapters. The study begins with an introduction, 
containing background and problem, a brief overview of research conceptualizing 
unorganized volunteers and research purpose. I will then explore the organizational point of 
departure and the analytical approach applied in the thesis, institutional logics. Part three will 
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present and explain choice of methods, and what I have done to ensure validity and reliability. 
The fourth section will present the findings of the study, followed by a discussion of the 
empirical data in light of the theoretical framework. Finally, I will conclude and answer the 




2 Theoretical framework 
This chapter will provide an overview of the theoretical point of departure in the study. First, 
a brief overview of organizations and their environments is presented. Second, the concept of 
boundary spanning personnel is described. Third, a description of the notion of institutional 
logics is given. Institutional logics approach is a systematic way to theorize the guidance of 
institutions on individual and organizational behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). The 
theory will provide a framework to analyse the empiric in the discussion section. Finally, the 
analytical implication for the thesis is presented.   
2.1 Organizations and their environments 
Organizational environment is understood as “an entity that lies outside the boundary of the 
organization, providing the organization with raw materials (inputs), and absorbing its 
products and services (outputs)” (Hatch 2006:63). Organizations are shaped by and adapt to 
their environments (Fincham and Rhodes 2005:478). Transaction across the organizational 
boundary takes place constantly (ibid). Organization is a product of environmental influence- 
it is “both embedded in and an active part of, its environment” (Hatch 2006:75) Therefore, it 
may be difficult to define the exact boundary between the organization and the surrounding 
environment (Fincham and Rhodes 2005, Hatch 2006).   
The topic of organisational environment has been addressed extensively in organizational 
theory (Fincham and Rhodes 2005, Thompson 1967, Hatch 2006, Duncan 1972), and in 
particular potential threats (Fincham and Rhodes, 2005; Duncan, 1972). More than forty years 
ago, Thompson (1967) proposed that organizations seek to manage their dependence on the 
environment. Organisations must adapt to the environment to survive and perform their 
functions (Duncan 1972). One of the main problems for organizations is coping with 
externally created uncertainty (Thompson 1967). Environmental uncertainty is defined by the 
amount of complexity and the rate of change in the organization’s environment (Hatch 
2006:78). Uncertainty can be created in a number of ways: environmental complexity 
(simple-complex) environmental stability (stable-dynamic) and environmental richness (rich-
poor) (Duncan 1972). Disasters create uncertain environments for organizations. Environment 
changes constantly (Hatch 2006) making emergencies difficult to predict (Perry 2004, Perry 
and Lindell 2003). Crisis management is thus about decision making under high degree of 
uncertainty (Aven 2010). Improvisation in crisis is essential as there is usually more than one 
way to solve a problem (Dynes 1990). Improvisation is a way to improve organizational 
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resilience in crisis management (Weick 1993:637), and need to be performed by actors at the 
site of emergencies (Dynes 1990, Kruke 2012).  
2.2 Boundary spanning 
The environment poses challenges to organizations in many different ways (Hatch 2006). But 
interaction between organization and environment is essential for organizations to survive. 
Therefor boundary spanning is crucial to organizations.  Boundary spanning is a complex 
phenomenon (Beechler at al. 2004). Boundary spanners operate at the skin of the organization 
and hence their functions are to interpret environmental conditions and rely that information 
to organization decision makers (Leifer and Huber 1976). They are the people who establish 
and maintain the linkage between the organization and the environment (Beechler at al. 
2004:122).  
The professional emergency responders are the boundary spanners of emergency response 
organizations (Johansson 2013). Coping with uncertainty is one of the central problems for 
organizations (ibid, Leifer and Huber 1976). Working in unpredictable and dynamic 
environment, professional emergency responders are forced to deal with uncertain conditions 
and changeable tasks (Johansson 2013). The degree of uncertainty may vary, depending on 
the nature of the task, and the environment of the organization (ibid). To understand the 
interaction between professional emergency responders and unorganized volunteers, it is 
crucial to study the nature of their relations. As all external contacts are not equally important 
for organizations, Johansson (2013) suggest a distinction between boundary spanners` 
external relations, where some are of primary task- related importance and others of 
secondary- related importance
4
. Professional emergency responders meet two kinds of 
unorganized people at the site of emergency: the victims of the incident, and the unorganized 
volunteers (ibid). To some emergency responders, the interaction with unorganized volunteers 
is of primary task-related, to others secondary task-related.  
Organizations function as a result of a number of different circumstances (Johansson 2013) 
and in interaction with environmental conditions (Hatch 2006:37). Example of environmental 
conditions may be the nature of the tasks, characters of collective identity, skills and training 
and demands from the environment (Johansson 2013). In this respect, organizations function 
                                                          
4
 Primary task-related importance refers to interaction between boundary spanners and organizationally 
unaffiliated individuals where encounters with clients are necessary, such as salespersons and hairdressers. 




according to different institutional logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008; Friedland and Alford 
1991).   
2.3 Institutional logics 
Do you know what is wrong with social theory?”  Roger Friedland
5
 asked a friend when he 
saw his newborn twins in the arms of his wife. “There`s no love in it- anyplace”. (Friedland; 
cited by Lounsbury and Boxenbaum 2013). Friedlands` struggle to understand this brought 
him to the work of Max Weber. Weber distinguishes between instrumental and value 
rationality (ibid). Instrumental values refer to the actors` cognitive action motivated by 
evaluating its consequences and consideration of the various means to achieve it. They are 
usually planned and taken after considering costs and consequences (Friedland; cited by 
Lounsbury, and Boxenbaum 2013).Value rationality action is motivated by valued goal, 
regardless of other consequences.  
Institutional logics is a concept within sociological theory and organizational studies. The 
concept was first presented by Friedland and Alford in 1991 (Thornton et al. 2012). The 
perspective was originally a criticism of organization theory for not situating “actors” in a 
societal context (ibid). Friedland and Alford (1991) argued that society and social relations 
are not just about the circulation of material structures, but also about culture and symbolic 
(Thornton et al 2012). Institutional logics are defined by Thornton and Ocasio (2008:101) as: 
“the socially constructed, historical patterns of cultural symbols and material practices, 
including assumptions, values, and beliefs, by which individuals and organizations provide 
meaning to their daily activities, organize time and space, and reproduce their lives and 
experiences”.  
The institutional logic of an organization guides the behavior of its actors; their attention is 
selective, and only occurrences considered as important within a given domain attract their 
attention (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Institutional logics affect the external relations of the 
boundary spanners i.e. professional emergency responders (Johansson 2013:4). The 
principles, practices and symbols of an institution offer a cognitive framework to be used by 
the actors` reasoning, vocabulary used to motivate action, and their sense of self and identity 
(Thornton et al. 2012). Furthermore, these symbols and practices are available to individuals, 
groups and organizations to further achieve desirable outcome (Friedland and Alford 1991). 
Institutional logics are both material and symbolic, providing formal and informal rules of 
                                                          
5
 Founder of institutional logics 
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action, interaction and interpretation (Thornton and Ocasio 1999). Formal logics are specific 
and observable and provide rules and regulations written in plans and laws. Informal logics 
are more “taken for granted” rules, existing because they are “talked and experienced” into 
existence (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Rules, both formal and informal, guide and oblige 
decision makers in realizing the organization`s tasks and in obtaining social status, credits, 
punishments, and rewards in the process (Ocasio 1997). Institutional logics shape rational and 
mindful behaviour (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). However, formal and informal aspects are 
intertwined (Sydnes 2011, Thornton et al. 2012). Formal procedures mainly connect roles and 
functions but not individuals (Selznick 1948; sited by Sydnes 2011). Formal organizational 
structures may fall short in complex situations (Sydnes 2011). As such, informal aspects may 
serve as a supplemental aspect (ibid). 
Institutional logics is a metatheoretical framework for analysing the interrelationship among 
institutions, individuals and organizations in a social system (Thornton et al. 2012). Friedland 
and Alford (1991) identify five institutions with distinctive and associated logics: family, 
religion, state, market, and corporation. In recent years two more have been added: 
community and profession (Thornton et al 2012). Each of the institutional orders in society 
has both material and cultural characteristics (Friedland and Alford 1991). Material aspects 
refer to structures and practises, cultural aspects refer to values and beliefs (Thornton et al. 
2012). An institutional logic approach emphasize that institutions develop and change as a 
result of the interaction between cultural and societal structures (Thornton and Ocasio 2008).  
If researchers are interested in questions of how individual and organizational actors are 
influenced by the institutional orders of for example the profession, as in this study, the 
institutional logics approach is a suitable analytical tool. An institutional order as for example 
profession, offer unique organizing principles, practises and references to guide the actors` 
behaviour (Thornton et al. 2012). A key assumption within the institutional logics is that the 
interests, identities and values of individuals and organizations are embedded within 
fundamental logics (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). Choices and consequences are a result of the 
interaction between individual agency and institutional structure (Friedland and Alford 1991). 
While individual and organizational actors may seek power, status, and economic advantage, 
the means and ends of their interests and agency are both enabled and constrained by 
prevailing institutional logics (Giddens 1984).  
12 
 
The logics of institutions affect the allocation of attention, regarding perception, 
interpretation, evaluation and response to environmental situations (Thornton and Ocasio 
2008). There are two interests by which institutions structure attention (Ocasio 1997):  
1. By creating a set of values that order the legitimacy, importance, and relevance of 
issues and solutions 
2. By providing decision makers with an understanding of their interests and identities 
These mechanisms provide motivation for action for actors within an organization (Thornton 
and Ocasio 2008). Institutional logics help us understand how individual and organizational 
behaviour is located in a social context and the social mechanisms that effect that behaviour 
(ibid).   
To sum up, institutional logics offers a cognitive scheme to actors within an organization, 
providing “rules” concerning behavior and decision making. The choices actors of an 
organization make, and the interaction between actors, are not free and independent, but 
influenced by institutional logics which either facilitate or constrain organizational action 
(Glynn and Raffaeli 2013). There are both formal and informal “rules” to guide the actors’ 
choice of action. To understand individual action in an organization, therefore, one has to look 
upon the institutional logic within the organization. Institutional logics affect the external 
relations of boundary spanners, and their relations and interaction with unorganized 
volunteers.  
2.4 Analytical implication 
The analytical implication is that the understanding of the institutional logics will help to 
identify and explain interaction patterns between professional emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers.  
The interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers is not random. In 
this thesis I seek to examine those factors that facilitate and constraint the interaction between 
the boundary spanning personnel (emergency responders) and unorganized volunteers. 
Aspects of institutional logics are both formal and informal. And may both facilitate and 




In order to illustrate the logic of the study I would like to introduce a figure: 
 
Figure 1. Interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers are 
based on formal and informal aspects 
Figure 1 illustrates “rules of action” that guide emergency responders. The rules are either 
formal or informal, and may both facilitate or constraint interaction between emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers. As such, logics provide a framework for social 














Research often starts with a sense of wonder, a question (Kleven et. al 2011:12). You may ask 
yourself:  “What is actually going on here? And why?” The research continues with an effort 
to answer, or at least shed light on this question (Kleven et. al 2011:15). Different research 
questions lead to the choice of different research strategies. To address the research questions 
posed in this thesis a qualitative
6
 (Ryen 2010) approach was applied, using semi-structured 
interviews, both individual- and group interviews, and textual analysis.  
According to Richards (2009:7) “… the techniques of qualitative research (..) are not linear 
but looping. The researcher learns from the data, returning to revise or revisit steps taken 
before that understanding developed.”  In other words, when using qualitative methodology, 
the researcher works continuously on the collected data, interprets and analyses. The 
researcher must analyze, not just repeat what the participants have said (Ryen 2002). 
3.1 Interview  
Interviews are the most applied source of data collection within qualitative research (Ryen 
2002:10). There are several different types of interviews (Ryen 2002: 15). I have chosen 
semi-structured interviews for my data collection. Semi-structured interviews are 
characterized by setting up main questions, issues or topics, without specifying detailed 
question wording or the order of these (Ryen 2002:99). All interviews were conducted in 
Tromsø, within a period of three weeks. The informants worked for the police, fire brigade or 
ambulance service. I also interviewed three members of the Red Cross. The initial sample of 
participants was selected based on their experience with crisis management. I interview 
emergency responders, as my thesis has an operational point of view. Both genders were 
represented, and their age ranged from 25-56 years. Years of experience in crisis management 
ranged from 2-18 years.  I interviewed nine persons; two from each of the above mentioned 
emergency response agencies and three from the Red Cross. For practical reasons, all 
interviews were conducted in Norwegian. All quotes from interviews are author`s translations. 
I have also applied some interview techniques recommended by Anne Ryen (Ryen 2002: 
106). Techniques can be used by the researcher to conduct the interview ahead, examples can 
be that the researcher “pumps” the informants for further information by responding using 
                                                          
6
 Qualitative methodology prioritizes proximity between the researcher and the subjects. The researcher is 
essential in the Interpretation of data, and knowledge is created through descriptions about the world we live 
in. A quantitative approach, on the other hand, deals with numbers, generalizations and testing of hypothesis. 
(Kleven et al. 2011, Ryen, A. 2002) 
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“mm” or “m-he” (Ryen 2010:106). Also, the researcher can ask for examples, ask the 
informant to amplify or simply ask for more information (Ryen 2010:106). The interviews 
should be introduced with “grand tour questions” (Ryen 2010). Such questions consist of 
informal questions, to make the informant relax. These questions are not repeated in the 
transcription, as the transcription only refer to the questions of the interview guide.  
Prior to the main fieldwork I conducted two preliminary interviews. The purpose was to map 
the area to be addressed, and to get a better understanding of the situation in order to 
formulate the right questions. In that regard I had to rewrite some of my original questions. 
Some of the questions that seemed reasonable to me were not that clear for my interviewees. 
In general, I experienced that terminology in crisis management was not as familiar to those 
actually working within the field.  
A surprising and not so pleasant experience I made when conducting preliminary interviews 
was that I got emotionally touched. It is not surprising that when digging into the reality of 
crisis management, experiences from professional rescuers and detailed description of 
disasters involving children, death, severe injury and family tragedies is challenging. Lessons 
learned from pre interviews made me feel better equipped when I started interviewing. 
When designing the interview guide
7
, I formulated open questions. I wanted to make the 
informants reflect about the questions I asked. I tried not to ask more than one question at a 
time, as double questioning often leads to the informant only answering the last of two 
questions (Lamark 2001:60). Yet, based on the transcription, it may look like this has been 
done. In case I have asked the informants two questions at once, this is due to interviewers 
expressing with their body language that they didn´t understand the first question, example by 
raising eyebrows. In that case I have tried to reformulate, to make them understand. (Body 
language is not easy to transcribe).  
When starting interviewing, I experienced that some of my questions didn´t make sense. For 
example asking emergency responders how they assume citizens will behave in crisis is 
impropriate. Some of my informants had up to eighteen years of experience with crisis 
management. They don´t assume, they know how people react in crisis. Also, I experienced 
that information given in one interview could affect the next interview, in terms of what I 
asked for. If something made me curious I asked the next respondent about the same, and so 
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 See appendix for the interview guide 
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on. I therefor had to rewrite my interview guide several times. I also had a few follow up 
questions, to clarify some minor details. These questions were sent and answered by mail. 
This is how qualitative method works and demonstrates why the method is a looping process 
Hellevik 2009). 
When having conducted six individual interviews with professional emergency organizations, 
I was in a phase in the study where I needed more information on the interaction between 
emergency responders and unorganized volunteers at the site of emergencies. Instead of 
interviewing more professional emergency responders, I was interested in other agencies 
present on the scene. Organized groups of volunteers are often present in emergencies (see 
figure 1), upon command from the police, contributing with rescuers, knowledge (example in 
avalanche) and equipment.  
In addition to individual interviews, a group interview was conducted. I conducted one 
interview with two volunteers from the Red Cross. I wanted to do a group interview
8
 to have 
the respondents reflect on the topic I am studying, hopeful that this setting would provide 
more valuable information. Group interview is suitable if a researcher needs more knowledge 
of a phenomenon or wishes to develop the issue further (Jacobsen 2000:141). I followed my 
semi-structured interview guide, and noticed that the two informants often discussed the 
issues between them. According to Jacobsen, people often do not reflect on happenings in 
everyday life. In that manner group interviews may be appropriate if the researcher wants the 
participants to reflect on subjects, and members of the group may help each other to describe 
events that may have been difficult to articulate (ibid).  
When conducting group interviews, the researcher should be aware of the group dynamic 
(Jacobsen 2000:144). The researcher should step in if one of the interviewees is dominant or 
doesn`t get a chance to speak (ibid). Having this in mind, I introduced the questions to them 




                                                          
8





Table 2 List of informants: 





Informant 1 40 Police 15 Male 
Informant 2 38 Police 7 Female 
Informant 3 29 Ambulance service 2,5 Male 
Informant 4 43 Ambulance service 17 Male 
Informant 5 56 Fire and rescue service 17 Male 
Informant 6 38 Fire and rescue service 15 Male 
Informant 7 26 Red Cross organization 2 Female 
Informant 8 27 Red Cross organization 6 Male 
Informant 9 53 Red Cross organization 18 Female 
Table 2 
 All interviews were recorded and later transcribed.  
3.2 Textual analysis 
The textual analysis is another source of data in the study. Documents as data source can be 
used differently in conjunction with either quantitative or qualitative methods (Blaikie et al 
2010:207). I have only used it qualitatively. Documents as data differ from other type of data 
as the researcher has limited, if any, controls of the collection (Jacobsen 2000:153). The 
empirical data exists already, and it is the researchers’ interpretation of data that is significant 
for the findings (Jacobsen 2000:153). “Documents have content. Such content requires 
analysis” (Prior 2004:358). There are four criteria that must be met in a textual analysis, these 
are: authenticity, credibility, representativeness and meaning (Scott 1990:19-35). Authenticity 
means the documents genuineness. Can we trust the document? Is it actually what it purports 
to be? Credibility is an expression of sincerity and accuracy. Did the authors believe in it? 
Representativeness can be measured through other similar papers. Does the document have a 
meaning? This latter criterion is of upmost importance, as it gives significance to the 
investigated topic.  
18 
 
I conducted textual analysis of the contingency plans for the fire- and rescue services, the 
police and the ambulance services, laws, regulations and evaluation of Barents Rescue 
exercise. I find that the documents analysed in my thesis meets all the requirements of a 
document analysis.  
Documents analysed in the study: 
 Law on fire and explosion protection  
 Barents Rescue Evaluation report  
 Contingency plan for the police, part 1 
 Procedural handbook for ambulance services  
 The Police Legislation  
 The Red Cross contingency plan for search and rescue 
 NOU 2012:14 
As already mentioned, the use of unorganized volunteers in contingency plans is poorly 
defined. The law on fire and explosion protection briefly terms the ability to utilize 
unorganized volunteers. The Police Legislation describes to some degrees potential laws that 
may influence the interaction between the police and unorganized volunteers. The 
contingency plan for the police, part 1 is a public document. It defines how the contingency in 
the police is built in a more general level. The contingency plan for the police, part 2 and 3 
states the procedures and responsibility of the police in different emergency situations. 
Unfortunately I have not been able to gain access to these two contingency plans as they are 
not publicly available. Instead I have asked questions in the interviews and my informants 
from the police have answered and reflected on the content of part 2 and 3 of the contingency 
plans. Also the ambulance service has a procedural handbook (“tiltaksbok”). It is not a public 
document, but fortunately I have been given the opportunity to read through it to search for 
relevant data for my study. The Red Cross contingency plan for search and rescue is not 
public available. However, I was having a copy of the two checklists used by the Red Cross 
organization in Oslo and Østfold. Finally, I have analysed an evaluation report from the 
Barents Rescue exercise 2013 (www.dsb.no) and the evaluation report of the terrorist attack in 
Norway, 22end of July, 2011 (NOU 2012:14). The reason for analysing the Barents Rescue 
evaluation report is that I asked about the exercise in the interviews. The 22end of July 
commission emphasizes what “an enormous resource an average citizen is in disaster”. In that 
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respect I find it interesting to analyze how the report regards unorganized volunteers in 
general, and what recommendations are given accordingly.  
When analysing contingency plans I first searched for all relevant information regarding 
unorganized volunteers. The relevant data I found was limited. Therefore I proceeded to 
search for data that could be interpreted as facilitating preparedness in crisis management in 
terms of utilizing unorganized volunteers. I was aware of denominations as “flexibility”, 
“improvising” and in general all procedures that may encourage professional responders to 
“think or act outside the box”.  
When analysing the evaluation report from the Barents Rescue exercise, I was especially 
interested in description of markers. Markers are representing actors that in real life will be 
unorganized volunteers (See table 1 “Golden Hour” Kruke 2012). How is the consciousness 
towards markers in an exercise setting? Are unorganized volunteers planned for and if so, 
how are they regarded as potential resources?     
The NOU 2012:14 was analysed because unorganized volunteers were a major contributor in 
the first aid and evacuation after the terrorist attack in Norway, 2011.  
There are places both in the interviews and in the text that expressions are termed in 
masculine form. Examples are firemen, “kjentmann” and The Norwegian Expression “den 
vanlige mann i gata”. Even though they are written in masculine form, they all refer to both 
genders.  
3.3 Research robustness 
There is consensus among social scientists that research shall be valid and reliable. Whether 
or not research is reliable and valid, is a matter of trust (Ryen 2010). I will in the following 
address the reliability and validly of this study. 
3.3.1 Reliability 
Reliability means trustworthiness (Ryen 2010). In research, high reliability means low 
affection of measurement error (Kleven 2011). Traditionally, reliability is characterizing the 
trustworthiness of measurements on time of measuring. Meaning the results would have been 
the same if any other researcher were conducting the same interviews. Therefore, common 
used synonyms of reliability are consistency, stability and preciseness (Kleven 2011).  
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3.3.2  Validity 
The term “Valid” originates from Latin, meaning “strong”. Oxford dictionary defines valid as 
effective because made or done with the correct formalities (Hornby 1974). Validity is related 
to the relevance of the data for the issue (Hellevik 2009). When assessing validity, we 
distinguish between internal validity and external validity (generalizability).   
3.3.3 Ensuring reliability and validity 
Qualitative method has been criticized for being subjective and based on the researchers’ 
observations and interpretations (Ryen 2010). The empiric is contextual, and there is no such 
thing as objective certainty in qualitative methodology, and critics claims validity and 
reliability is questionable (ibid). Validity becomes questionable if the researcher does not 
attempt to refer to, or discuss, divergent cases, whereas reliability may be complained due to 
lack of access to the data material (Ryen 2010). To accommodate the critics the researcher 
should record and transcribe all interviews, refer to or discuss deviating examples and make 
use of primary sources (Kleven 2011).  
To ensure reliability, all my interviews were recorded and transcribed. In this matter, the data 
collections are being made open and transparent. When transcribing, all recordings where 
transformed from words to text. Recordings were accurate written. All interviewed agreed on 
being taped. I did not experience the recorder as a hindrance of the interview. Rather the 
opposite, as one of the ambulance service professionals noted when I asked permission to 
quote him in my thesis:  
You don`t have to e-mail the quotes to check if you have understood me right, you have it recorded 
(informant 3).  
Concerning subjectivity I realise that I am who I am and see what I see. The interview setting 
is personal and contextual. I also experience that I became more and more comfortable 
interviewing after conducting the first 2-3 interview. Nevertheless, I had in mind always to try 
to be as objective as possible. For example, I asked informants to verify their statements by 
repeating or deepen their answers to make sure I had understood them right. However, the 
question of subjectivity will always be a matter of discussion when it comes to qualitative 
methods.  
To ensure validity I have been aware of the following: When interviewing and analysing data 
I was conscious of the tendency to emphasize information that conform to the researchers 
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perceptions, so called “confirmation bias”. During the process of data collection there were 
examples of deviating findings. These are being discussed in the discussion section.  
There are, however challenges regarding the validity of the conclusions. The succeeding 
section will count for the limitations in this respect.  
3.4 Challenges 
Five out of six interviews were conducted when the informants was on duty. There was 
constantly a possibility the informants had to leave the interview for a mission. Especially the 
ambulance personnel were busy. I had to wait several hours on the first interviewees. When 
he finally had time to do the interview, he had to do the interview while eating lunch. For the 
next ambulance personnel interview, I had asked for a woman. Unfortunately she was busy all 
day, and for practical reasons she was replaced with a man. The interviewing situation was a 
bit stressful, and I felt I had to rush through the interview guide, posing the risk that the 
interview would be interrupted, or worse, cancelled. The least stressful interviews were those 
with the fire and rescue personnel. Although, they too made it clear from the beginning of the 
interview that if the alarm goes on, they had to run. Fortunately it didn´t, and I had plenty of 
time both on grand tour questions and digging into their experience of crisis management.  
Although the interviewing situation was a bit stressful at times, all interviewees were positive 
I could contact them later if it should turn out I needed more information. I formulated a few 
follow ups, which I sent to the respondent by e-mail. All respondent answered my additional 
questions by mail.  
3.5 Limitations 
The qualitative nature of my study limits its generalization of the topic studied. However, it 
provides insight about emergency responders and their awareness of the utilization of 
unorganized volunteers. The study has an operational point of view. I have interviewed 
emergency workers working in the sharp end
9
, not the blunt end
10
. I chose to interview 
volunteers from the Red Cross, even though there are many more voluntary organizations in 
Tromsø. Other voluntary organizations may have provided more information to my study, but 
due to time limits, I chose to interview only these from the Red Cross. Furthermore, all nine 
respondents worked currently in Tromsø, and data from interviews may indicate that practice 
and experiences are different elsewhere. Tromsø has a great number of available emergency 
                                                          
9
 The sharp end refer to the “the field” in emergencies (Kruke and Olsen 2012) 
10
 The blunt end refer to the bureaucracy, workers doing the planning and paper work (Kruke and Olsen 2012) 
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responders, both professionals and organized volunteers, in case of emergencies. Also, the 
community is relatively small in area, so emergency response won’t take long when/if disaster 
strikes. Accordingly generalization is difficult. Even so, the study provides insight in the 
logics of emergency responding agencies.  
Lastly, neither of the respondents had experienced large scale disasters. Fortunately, 
catastrophes are rare in everyday life. Coping with everyday emergencies are thus a test on 
how emergency responders will act and cope within the constraints of the institution.   
3.6 Ethics 
Finally I will account for the research ethics regarding the researcher and the informants. I 
contacted all the informants by mail, where I described the aim of the study. All the 
professional emergency rescuers did receive the interview guide prior the interview. The 
interviews conducted with the members of the Red Cross did not get the interview guide sent 
in advance, because the interviews were conducted more or less ad hoc. Instead I gave them 
brief information about the study before I started interviewing. All informants were informed 
of the volunteer participation, the use of recorder and the ability to withdraw from the 
interview at any time. All were given the possibility to read through quotes stated by them in 
the text.  
I conducted a notification test on the website for Data Protection Official for Research
11
. The 
test showed that I have neither directly nor indirectly identifiable personal data registered in 
my project, meaning the project will not be subject for notification.   
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The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings. It offers data on the emergency 
responders’ beliefs, values, laws, procedures and training. All of which provide emergency 
responders a cognitive framework to be used when interacting with unorganized volunteers. 
The findings will be presented in accordance with the research questions. 
Findings in the study emphasize how the interaction between emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers are influenced by formal and informal practices. The presentation will 
be divided into two main sections; formal rules of action, and informal practices. While 
presenting the data I will reflect on what factors facilitate and what create obstacles for the 
interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. 
4.1 Formal rules of action 
This section will present an overview of the formal rules of action, guiding the emergency 
responders within the emergency agencies studied (boundary spanning personnel).  The 
section will be divided into subsections, which are laws and procedures, contingency plans, 
training and exercises, challenges and finally a summary discussing the findings.  
4.1.1 Laws, procedural handbooks and checklists  
Any emergency respondent is obliged to act in accordance to laws. Of the three professional 
emergency responding agencies studied, only the fire and rescue teams have law that 
addresses issues related to unorganized volunteers. The Law on fire and explosion protection 
(Brannvernloven, chapter 2, §5) states: 
Any citizen present at the scene of an accident, explosion or fire, are obliged, to the best of their ability, 
to assist in minimizing damage.  
Any citizen is obliged to assist the fire and rescue service in rescue and extinguishing, whenever the 
scene commander demand, and make property, material, and if needed, human resources, available for 
such emergency response.  
The police have no laws describing the interaction or ability to utilize unorganized volunteers. 
However, the police legislation encourages for improvisation when emphasizing (Politiloven 
chapter 5, §27): 
The police shall take the necessary initiative to avoid danger and minimize damage in times of crises 
and disasters  
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“Necessary initiative” implies all actions necessary, including utilizing unorganized 
volunteers. Police has the overall command on the scene. Their primary concern is to 
investigate emergencies in case of criminal acts and secure the area. They are in charge of the 
coordination among actors and organizing the scene.  When arriving at the site of an 
emergency they too have a checklist to organize their work at the scene (Informant 1). Police 
has little attention towards unorganized volunteers. The following statement illustrates the 
priority of the police:    
When arriving the scene, our main concern is securing the area, saving lives and evacuate injured. This 
is common to all emergency response organizations. But in addition we will have to investigate the 
event. Our plans do not include unorganized volunteers (Informant 1). 
In other words: unorganized volunteers are not part of the formal rules held by the police. If 
unorganized volunteers are being utilized in emergencies, this is due to reasons related to 
informal aspects. This will be addressed later in this chapter. 
Regarding the use of unorganized volunteers, a fire and rescue respondent noted: 
Fire and rescue are in charge of the site of an emergency until police arrives. Upon authority of the 
emergency commander [fire and rescue], we may demand help among the average citizen being present. 
There may be craftsmen, businesses with mechanics nearby, carpenters even, whom you may use. Even 
if there is a class [people] on a bus; you may utilize resources [humans] from that bus, as unorganized 
volunteers (informant 5). 
But even though the respondents from the fire and rescue service were aware of the possibility 
to utilize unorganized volunteers, this is not their main concern. The fire and rescue have as 
an overall focus to extinguish fire (Informant 6). Their primary focus in emergencies is not to 
interact with unorganized volunteers, rather the opposite:  
We are extremely focused that a fire scene is dangerous, and a risky place to be, so we want all people 
to remove. It is a reflex. We declare the area safe for other professional emergency responders. We are 
so focused on extinguishing fire, having attention toward other tasks [like coordinating/utilizing 
unorganized volunteers] is difficult (Informant 6).  
When declaring the area as safe, we are even more focused to protect the public [than to include the 
public in emergency response] (Informant 6). 
As such, formal rules held by the fire and rescue teams may both facilitate and constraint the 
interaction with unorganized volunteers. On one side the interaction is facilitated through the 
law of fire and explosion protection. The law encourages emergency responders from the fire 
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and rescue to utilize the average citizen on the scene, if needed. On the other hand, fire and 
rescue services are trained to keep the average citizen in secure areas, away from the fire.  
For the ambulance services the focus on the patient is of primary concern. They are trained in 
first aid care and use of medical equipment (Informant 3, 4). The health care system is 
characterized by “a logic of medicine” (Johansson 2013:8)
12
. The procedural handbook of the 
ambulance service describes many different possible medical conditions.  There is a chapter 
concerning the procedures when coming to the site of an emergency. The first paramedic 
arriving at the scene is responsible for reporting status of the emergency. This report includes 
position, event, possible threats, number of patients, type of injuries and available resources 
present. The latter point, “available resources and the need for further assistance”, does not 
specify what type of resources. However, both informants (Informant 3, 4) from the 
ambulance service were clear that unorganized volunteers are a resource in this respect. “The 
average citizens are the one to save lives” (Informant 3). Regarding crisis management on the 
scene, the procedural handbook provides a checklist to be used by the leader of the paramedic 
(“operativ leder helse”). The worksheet suggests mapping all available resources on the scene 
and identifying persons who possesses local knowledge (“kjentmann”). Also the fire and 
rescue noted the importance of recognising such locals as they are familiar with the 
construction of buildings, number of residents, and knowledge of people in the building etc. 
(Informant 5). Such locals may provide valuable information of the area, for example 
regarding avalanche, knowledge of potential resources such as access to buildings and 
available equipment on the scene (Informant 5, 6). Such information is essential and may be 
vital (Informant 6).   
The Red Cross is another relevant organization dealing with unorganized volunteers. The first 
priority of the Red Cross organized volunteers is to “prevent and relieve suffering” (Informant 
9). Besides, the three respondents (Informant 7, 8, 9) from the Red Cross all emphasized the 
growing awareness for the use of unorganized volunteers. However, it is crucial to organize 
them. One informant from the Red Cross stated: 
We have seen that they [unorganized volunteers] are a huge resource, but we need to organize them 
somehow. Otherwise they will become a “time thief” instead of a resource (Informant 9).  
Another respondent from the Red Cross emphasized: 
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We need a system to organize the unorganized volunteers, both before, during, and maybe especially 
after the crisis (informant 7). 
The Red Cross volunteers regarded themselves as the link between professional emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers (Informant 7). In that respect it would be natural for 
them [the Red Cross organization] to develop plans for the utilization of unorganized 
volunteers (Informant 7, 8). See 4.1.2 for further discussion.  
4.1.2 Contingency plans 
Contingency plans for Norwegian professional emergency agencies, do not describe how 
emergency responders best can take advantage of unorganized volunteers (Procedural 
handbook for the ambulance service, Contingency plans for the police, part 1). Neither the 
police, nor the ambulance nor the fire and rescue organization provide their actors with formal 
tools on how to utilize unorganized volunteers. The Red Cross organization on the other hand 
is aware that there is a growing need for formal instruction on how to interact with 
unorganized volunteers (Informant 9). The Red Cross in Tromsø does not have a written 
document on how to manage, interact with, or utilize unorganized volunteers (Informants 7, 8, 
9). Yet they intend to develop this kind of plan (Informants 7, 8, 9). So far, knowledge of how 
to best interact with unorganized volunteers are based on experiences and improvisation in the 
field (Informants 7, 8, 9). However, the Red Cross organizations in Oslo and Østfold have 
written documents on how to interact and/or utilize unorganized volunteers (Informant 9). The 
contingency plans are designed as checklists to be used in search and rescue operations. The 
Red Cross organization in Tromsø is currently developing similar contingency plans 
(Informant 7). 
The contingency plan concerning interaction with unorganized volunteers made by the Red 
Cross Organization in Oslo consists of two checklists. One checklist is intended for the 
commander, and the other for the team leader
13
. The unorganized volunteers shall be 
considered in many aspects; relevant knowledge/experience, suitable clothing, age and the 
volunteers relation toward the missing person (in search and rescue operations). Unorganized 
are not allowed equipment from the Red Cross like GPS, inter-com or tracker. In search and 
rescue operations unorganized volunteers shall be given areas considered to be the least 
complicated. 
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 A search and rescue action normally consists of several teams. Every team has one leader, and there is also 
an overall leader in command (Informant 9).  
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When briefing unorganized volunteers prior to search and rescue operations the Red Cross 
organized need to collect personal information (List of names and telephone numbers), and 
inform unorganized in how to gather information when searching. Unorganized volunteers are 
briefed whether or not to shout for missing people, the use of sight, hearing and other senses 
during search, the use of cell phones, procedures in case of findings and finally the overall 
focus on the missing person.  
The checklist also emphasizes the responsibility of the police towards unorganized volunteers, 
regarding follow-ups, information and briefings.  
The contingency plan made by the Red Cross organization in Østfold, consists of four 
checklists. One checklist used by the commander emphasizing the responsibility of the Police. 
The commander shall have in mind that teams from the Red Cross should be prioritized 
before organizing unorganized volunteers. In case unorganized volunteers are used in search 
and rescue operation, they shall be set to search the least complicated area. These areas will 
be searched by professional teams at a later stage. Unorganized volunteers will not have 
access to equipment belonging to the Red Cross. Cell phones may be used for communication 
purposes only. 
The second checklist covers briefing of unorganized volunteers and should consist of the 
following: the importance of not leaving the team, information about search and rescue, the 
use of senses, how to spend time and not rush, whether or not to shout for missing persons, 
code of conduct, the importance of confidentiality, information about personal safety, the 
significance of informing the team when leaving the group/leaving for the day, procedures in 
case of findings and finally the overall focus on the missing person.  
The third checklist emphasizes the importance of the team leader introducing himself for the 
unorganized volunteers, and map their experience and background. 
The fourth checklist highlights the responsibility of the leader of the unorganized volunteering 
group. He should gather unorganized volunteers in a closed area, collecting names and 
personalia and always having an overview of who is in and who is out. The checklist 
describes the requirements with regard to proper clothing, age limits, physical shape and 
personal relation between the volunteer and the missing person. All checklists have a final 
point regarding the overall focus on the missing person.  
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The content of the two plans regarding unorganized volunteers, operated by the Red Cross, is 
relatively identical. The checklists are designed for search and rescue, suitable in avalanche 
and when people are missing. The checklists are not designed for other type of emergencies 
(Informant 9).  
The checklists are formal rules of action both facilitating and constraining interaction with 
unorganized volunteers. The fact that the Red Cross recognize unorganized volunteers as 
potential helpers demonstrate how the checklists itself are facilitators for the interaction 
between unorganized volunteers and the organized Red Cross. Nevertheless the checklists 
also constraint the interaction between unorganized volunteers and the organized Red Cross, 
as civilians are selected and used according to different criteria.  Yet, the checklists provide 
the organized Red Cross with formal rules of action. In addition to informal aspects, the 
checklists (formal rules) provide the members of the organized Red Cross a cognitive 
framework to be used when facing unorganized volunteers in emergencies.   
The organized Red Cross, in addition to other organized volunteers, will not be present in 
emergencies in “the golden hour” of emergencies (Informant 9). In exercises conducted by 
professional emergency responders- and services they train as if the Red Cross organization 
and other volunteering organizations will be present at the scene in the “golden hour” of an 
emergency. But in real life, it is most likely that professional emergency responders will have 
to rely on unorganized volunteers in the golden hour, rather than organized emergency 
response organizations (Informant 7, 8 and 9). However, the respondents from professional 
emergency agencies did not regard this as a problem (Informant 1, 5).  
Contingency plans are written documents on how to prepare and train for an undesirable 
event. The above findings illustrate that emergency responders have limited plans on how to 
interact and/or utilize unorganized volunteers.    
4.1.3 Training and exercises 
Exercises provide context to test both the training program and the plan (Perry 2004). The 
above findings demonstrate that emergency responders have limited contingency plans on 
how to interact and/or utilize unorganized volunteers. Hence, the emergency responders do 
not train on this matter. The findings in the following section illustrate the lack of 
attentiveness towards unorganized volunteers in a training context. The informants disagreed 
on whether training on the interaction with unorganized volunteers was necessary or not. One 
informant from the police claimed the main purpose for exercising with organized 
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volunteering groups is to get to know each other [emergency responders] and each other’s 
procedures, not how to interact with unorganized volunteers (Informant 1). Whereas 
informants from the Red Cross emphasized the value of both having a written plan and also 
train for the use of unorganized volunteers (informant 7, 8). 
The informants also disagreed on whether or not they train on how to utilize unorganized 
volunteers. The opinion depended on the fact if their organizations train for the use on 
unorganized volunteers or not. Two of the Red Cross respondents claimed they did not train 
on how to utilize unorganized volunteers (Informant 7, 8), but the third respondent from the 
Red Cross, stressed they did (Informant 9). One of the policemen even replied he did not 
remember if he had ever been educated in the use of unorganized volunteers (Informant 1). 
The contingency plan for the police stresses that it is crucial for the police to participate in 
exercises with other emergency response agencies (The contingency plan for the police, part 
1). Exercises should be based on cooperation with other agencies providing emergency 
response; the military, the community/municipal management and administration, local 
businesses, organized volunteering groups and the public [unorganized volunteers].   
There is no written plan on how to exercise, or interact with unorganized volunteers in any of 
the professional emergency response agencies. It may seem that the attention towards 
unorganized volunteers is absent. The respondents had not experienced exercises where 
training in utilizing unorganized volunteers was part of the plan. Neither the Barents Rescue
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exercise nor other full scale exercises in the area of Tromsø included unorganized volunteers 
when training for emergencies (Informant 2). However, informants agreed training for 
utilizing unorganized volunteers is possible (Informant 7, 8). One of the informants from the 
Red Cross stressed there is no reason why they should not train in utilizing unorganized 
volunteers.  
If there is as plan on how to utilize the average citizen [unorganized volunteer], the chances are greater 
the potential [unorganized volunteers] will be better utilized. If we exercise for the use of unorganized 
volunteers then everybody know this is a resource we may utilize. But today [unorganized volunteers] 
are a resource that is more or less pushed away (Informant 8). 
Another participant from the Red Cross emphasized the value of exercising for the use of 
unorganized volunteers: 






You may scream out what resources you need [in emergencies], and briefly map the skills and 
knowledge [of unorganized volunteers]. To give [unorganized volunteers] a task they feel comfortable 
and familiar with is rewarding for their self being (Informant 7) 
Lack of resources and time was however mentioned as an obstacle (Informant 5). One 
informant from the fire and rescue service noted that if they should exercise in the use of 
unorganized volunteers this would be at the expense of other exercises:  
We may exercise on the use of unorganized volunteers from tomorrow on. Unfortunately there are no 
available resources to do so (Informant 6). 
All nine respondents agreed that unorganized volunteers may be utilized to a greater extend. 
Some of the respondents had not reflected on how this is practicable, whilst other had a clear 
understanding of how this may be achieved:  
I think we may utilize the average citizen to a larger extend, but it requires that we take them 
[unorganized volunteers] into account when we train. We may practice in the use of civilians, thinking: 
“If there had been anyone present here now, we may have utilized them to certain tasks”. We may 
visualise there are a lot of people present, or a few, and then we have at least thought through the 
possibilities to utilize them [unorganized volunteers]. Then it is easier to utilize them [unorganized 
volunteers] [in emergencies] and organize them (informant 7). 
Exercises are formal rules of action, providing emergency responders a setting to test the 
training program and the plan. As mentioned above, the professional emergency responders 
interviewed lack both procedures and written plans on how to interact with unorganized 
volunteers. Hence, interaction with unorganized volunteers is absent in exercises and training. 
The Red Cross in Tromsø, on the other hand, are currently developing contingency plans 
including unorganized volunteers. The Red Cross in Oslo and Østfold have developed similar 
contingency plans, as a consequent of increasing need to organize unorganized volunteers at 
the site of emergencies. So far, the organized Red Cross in Tromsø do not train in utilizing 
unorganized volunteers, but the informants from the Red Cross all agreed doing so would be 
both possible and reasonable. Having thought through different scenarios where unorganized 
volunteers could be utilized would provide the organized Red Cross a formal rule of action 
when facing unorganized volunteers in emergencies.    
4.1.4 Challenges in the use of unorganized volunteers 
A number of challenges were emphasized related to formal aspects of the use of unorganized 
volunteers. These include problems regarding confidentiality: 
31 
 
Unorganized volunteers do not have to be aware of the discretion aspect in emergencies (Informant 9) 
In addition, once unorganized volunteers are incorporated in plans, there are requirements 
regarding HSE
15
 and internal controls (Informant 5, 6). Moreover, one informant pointed 
unorganized volunteers do not have access to inter-com. As such there may be a problem 
communicating (Informant 9). Challenges regarding proper clothing were also mentioned: 
Unorganized volunteers are often not properly dressed for the applicable weather conditions (Informant 9) 
Unorganized volunteers do not wear proper outfit for firefighting (informant 6) 
Other challenges come from unorganized volunteers` lack of skills: 
Unorganized volunteers lack knowledge on use of equipment (informant 5) 
Unorganized volunteers are not familiar with an emergency situation, nor the tasks that may be carried out 
(informant 6) 
One respondent from the ambulance service pointed they were not allowed to demand 
unorganized volunteers to assist in emergencies (Informant 3):  
We can`t order unorganized volunteers to assist us. The police are allowed, not us. We don`t have the 
authority to do so (Informant 3) 
Another informant from the ambulance service stressed unorganized volunteers are not paid, 
and this constrained him from using the average citizen in emergencies (Informant 4). 
Another obstacle refers to the unorganized volunteers’ lack of insurance: 
There is a problem regarding insurance. If I give them a task, and they get injured, they have no 
insurance (Informant 9) 
The above mentioned statements all illustrate formal rules of action constraining the 
interaction with unorganized volunteers. When facing an emergency situation these factors 
are a part of the emergency responders’ cognitive scheme, guiding the responders’ evaluation 
of the situation.  The rules provide meaning to the emergency responders’ choice of action.  
One of the respondents also pointed out the importance of taking care of unorganized 
volunteers after they have participated in an emergency response operation (informant 7). 
Contrary to professional emergency responders and organized volunteers, unorganized 
volunteers are not offered any debriefing: 
                                                          
15
 Health, Safety and Environment 
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They [unorganized volunteers] are being left to themselves after assisting in crisis. Maybe they are 
frustrated or have questions, or maybe they wonder did I do it right. It is crucial for the well-being of the 
person, but also if he or she will participate again in the future, that they have opportunity to talk to 
somebody. There is for example “The Red Cross Care”. They may be helpful in this respect. We can 
give them phone numbers and names, and offer them debriefing if needed (informant 7).   
Also, the organized Red Cross are trained in accepting commands, but unorganized volunteers 
may experience commands as negative, and then the leader of the team [organized from the 
Red Cross] will have to spend time explaining, whereas the organized Red Cross will accept 
orders immediately (Informant 9). 
Professional emergency responders prioritizes use of own personnel or other professional 
emergency responders. However, if these resources are insufficient unorganized volunteers 
may be utilized in emergencies. As one policeman noted: 
“It depends on how many resources I have got. If I have sufficient resources, I don’t have to use 
unorganized volunteers, but if I don’t have the capacity to respond, it is natural for me to involve people 
who are present” (Informant 1). 
This latter statement illustrates that availability of resources may be both a formal and 
informal factor guiding the emergency responders when interacting with unorganized 
volunteers. If professional emergency responders have enough resources (formal), they don`t 
need to use unorganized volunteers. However, if they lack professional emergency responders 
on the site, it is more likely unorganized volunteers will be used (informal).   
One point stated by an informant from fire and rescue emphasizing the unorganized 
volunteers need to help: 
We know from previous [cases] that people having minor injuries [in accidents] may be relieved by the 
opportunity to be a fellow human. Instead of ripping them out of the scene, putting them in an 
ambulance, it may be better to remain in the bus [in case of a bus accident] to take care of other injured 
and give emotional support. It may relief their own sorrow and despair (Informant 6).  
The above finding illustrates a number of challenges related to formal rules of action. 
Challenges related to informal rules of action will be discussed in section 4.2.3. 
4.1.5 Summary  
The description of unorganized volunteers in written documentation is limited. The fact that 
the average citizen may be utilized in emergencies is mentioned only once (The Law on fire 
and explosion protection). Neither do the three professional emergency agencies studied 
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practice on the use of such resources. According to Norwegian law, citizens present at the site 
of a traffic accident are obliged to assist, in accordance with their ability, to limit damage. The 
Norwegian law on road traffic emphasizes the responsibility of people being involved in 
accidents, or being first on the scene, to assist humans (Vegtrafikkloven Chapter 2 §12). Still, 
there is a lack of focus on the interaction between emergency responders and unorganized 
volunteers.  
Formal rules facilitating the use of unorganized volunteers are poor. Only the Law of fire and 
explosion protection point unorganized volunteers may be used in emergencies. Other laws 
and procedures were not that clear in this respect; however there are regulations facilitating 
for improvisation. Regarding accidents and disasters, the police legislation stresses that the 
police are responsible for “initiating remedial actions” to prevent and reduce serious damage. 
The procedural handbook for the ambulance service stresses the need to map all available 
resources. Even though it is not written, my informants from the ambulance service regarded 
unorganized volunteers in this respect.  
The contingency plans for the Red Cross organization applied in search and rescue actions are 
formalized use of unorganized volunteers. The Red Cross organization is aware there is a 
need to organize people assisting in actions. Although the checklist is limited to emergencies 
like search and rescue, there is a growing concern that unorganized volunteers participating in 
emergencies must be organized somehow. 
There are some practical and ethical obstacles concerning use of unorganized volunteers in 
emergencies. Practical challenges may be lack of access to inter-com, they are not paid for 
their assistance in emergencies, nor do they have insurance. The average citizens lack 
knowledge of emergency situation and are not familiar with procedures, nor are they trained 
in the use of emergency equipment. They are not implemented in contingency plans or 
training procedures. Ethical obstacles may be regarded in terms of confidentiality; 
unorganized volunteers may be under age and they may not be properly dressed for 
emergencies. The informants from the fire and rescue service (Informant 5, 6) where the 
professional emergency responders that had the strongest awareness unorganized volunteers 
may be utilized in emergencies. But they were also the informants pointing to the health, 
safety and environment requirements regarding involving unorganized volunteers. The 
informants from the ambulance service (Informant 3, 4) emphasized that they are not allowed 
to demand unorganized volunteers to help them, only the police. Nevertheless, the ambulance 
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services repeated several times the importance of improvising in crisis management. Utilizing 
unorganized volunteers are indeed part of this, and will be discussed below (Chapter 4.2.1). 
The respondents from the police (Informant 1, 2) regarded many of their tasks as absolutely 
not appropriate for unorganized volunteers, such as live action (shooting) and criminal acts. In 
exercises, markers are not considered to be a potential resource for professional emergency 
responders. Rather, they [markers] are given the task to act injured and dependent on help. 
Also, according to informants from the police and the Red Cross markers are not being 
briefed properly in how people actually behave in emergencies. Points mentioned above are 
all examples of formal institutional logic constraining the utilization of unorganized 
volunteers. Last, but not least, preparing for crisis requires resources. To include training on 
the use of unorganized volunteers more money must be granted (Informant 6).  However, 
developing contingency plans, planning and performing for exercises are time- and resource 
consuming. 
4.2 Informal practices 
This section will provide an overview of the informal practices that are guiding actions of 
emergency responders (boundary spanning personnel) within the emergency agencies studied. 
Primary issues related to informal aspects that are the drivers of the interactions between 
emergency responders and unorganized volunteers are (1) personal experiences and 
perceptions and (2) internal discussions among colleagues. These may both facilitate and 
constraint interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. The section 
will address issues related to citizens’ behaviour, communication, improvisation and 
challenges regarding informal practices. Finally a summary of findings will be provided.  
4.2.1 Personal experiences and perceptions 
Different experiences on how citizens` behave in emergency situations influences the 
interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers.   
Studies emphasizes that contingency plans must conform to the actual behavior of people on a 
disaster site (Auf der Heide 2004:364, Dynes 1990). And who is better to know how people 
behave in emergency, but the emergency responders working in the field? All the emergency 
responders in the study had a variety of experiences with citizen behaviour in emergencies. 
People react with stress, fear, chock, sorrow and despair (Informant 1, 3, 5). But also 
calmness and compositeness were observed reactions amongst people (Informant 2, 3, 4). All 
responders had experienced acute stress responses like freeze, flight and fight behaviour 
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(Cannon 1915) amongst people on the scene. Fight was the most prominent citizen behaviour, 
which is illustrated in the following two statements: 
Some are cool and some are hysteric. But in general, people are calm. I would say only ten percent are 
not able to control themselves (Informant 3) 
My impression is that people are reasonable; they act calm and professional, if you can say that about 
people (Informant 5).  
However, two of the respondents from the Red Cross organizations experience that civilians 
[unorganized volunteers] participated in crisis when they were alone or few, but once there 
where many people present the willingness to act decreased (Informant 7, 8). Also, some 
informants experienced that in recent years, people tend to care less: 
 Civilians are becoming more and more cynical, everyday life is busy (Informant 4). 
There are situations where people are just passing. I experience that people just pass when there are 
people lying down on the street (Informant 8) 
The respondents discussed the tendency to care less if more people or emergency responders 
are present in the following way:  
Maybe someone is afraid of doing anything wrong, and therefor backs off. They forget that it is 
important to be emotional supportive. To ask someone “How are you” or to be a fellow human may be 
enough (Informant 7) 
 The most important in first aid is to act. You can`t do anything wrong. To actually do something is to do 
the right thing (Informant 8).  
When asked which tasks would be reasonable to delegate to unorganized volunteers in 
emergencies, they all agreed that the tasks had to be simple and precise (Informants 1-9). 
Tasks like carrying equipment, blocking of traffic, directing traffic, carrying stretchers, give 
emotional support to victims or injured, taking care of people in shock (there is a chance 
people in chock may start wandering around, a respondent from fire and rescue noted 
(informant 5)), search and rescue in avalanche, heart compressions, extinguish fire and carry 
water. One of the policemen described how he could scream out and ask if there are 
professional medical responders present: “Does anyone have medical expertise?” (Informant 
1). Also the Red Cross organised were aware citizens` skills and proficiencies: “If there is a 
nurse, give her a first aid task instead of carrying stuff or maybe some of the unorganized 
have avalanche knowledge” (Informant 7). Informants found it appropriate to map the 
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competence of unorganized volunteers, before delegating tasks (Informant 7, 8). But 
unorganized volunteers do not need a lot of practice to be a resource. As one fireman noted: 
They [unorganized volunteers] do not need insight in extinguishing of wildfire to be a resource. 
Considering removing dried grass from the area, give them a shovel. Or they may carry water hoses, 
carry stuff and water. There are many tasks that may be delegated to citizens [present in emergencies]. 
(Informant 5) 
The above findings illustrate citizens’ behaviour in emergencies, and how emergency 
responders think and value unorganized volunteers. The way emergency responders perceive 
unorganized volunteers guides the interaction with citizens willing to help in emergencies. 
These aspects may both facilitate and constraint the interaction. Nevertheless, they are 
informal factors, part of a cognitive scheme held by emergency responders and helps 
allocating attention in emergencies. Knowledge about citizens’ actual behaviour is important 
when exploring if unorganized volunteers may be utilized to a greater extend in emergencies. 
Communication is another central aspect when studying the interaction between emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers. 
Different perspective on how to communicate is a crucial aspect when interacting with, and 
utilizing, unorganized volunteers. Unorganized volunteers are far more willing to assist if they 
are given instructions (Informant 7). However, the respondents disagreed how to best 
communicate with, or delegate tasks to unorganized volunteers:  
You can`t use a type A
16
 leadership style when managing unorganized volunteers. This type of 
management requires that the people you are set to lead know what you are talking about (Informant 8).  
On the other hand, both the police and the ambulance personnel emphasized the importance of 
being as specific as possible when ordering unorganized volunteers for assistance: 
If I order [an unorganized volunteer]: “Go pick up the oxygen bag”, I can`t expect that he knows [what 
bag I mean], so, I need to be specific: “Go to the ambulance, where the  tailgate is open and pick up the 
blue bag, and bring me the blue bag” (Informant 3).  
[When ordering assistance from unorganized volunteers]: “There is a yellow west in the [police] car.
 Go and put it on and go directing the traffic in that other direction!” (Informant 1).  
I interpret the way both the police and the ambulance service communicate with unorganized 
volunteers to be a type A leadership style. The way the police and the ambulance service 
                                                          
16
 The Red Cross organization classifies styles of leadership into five categories, ranging from A-E, where A 
represents the most authoritarian, and E is the most including (Informant 9).  
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approaches the unorganized are more authoritative than the organized Red Cross recon it the 
best way to communicate. However, the way they all communicate with unorganized 
volunteers is based on their personal experiences on what is the most practical. Findings 
illustrate that emergency responders are not trained how to communicate with unorganized 
volunteers, nor is it described in plans or procedures. The informants communicate with 
unorganized in different ways. How the emergency responders communicate with 
unorganized volunteers is guided by their personal beliefs of what they conceive as 
appropriate, and this influences the way communication is conducted. Some emergency 
responders believe in a commanding form of communication (Informant 1, 3), whereas others 
rely on a “softer” way of communicating (Informant 7, 8).  
The focus of the research is to understand the interaction between emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers, and how emergency responders may utilize unorganized volunteers 
the best way. Informal aspects of interaction between emergency response organizations and 
unorganized volunteers are shaped through values and “taken for granted” perceptions 
(Thornton and Ocasio, 2008). Another aspect by informal practices and personal experiences 
in particular, is improvisation. Environment is unstable therefor improvisation is important in 
emergencies. Emergency responders are not driven by command and control principles, but a 
logic of appropriateness.  
Findings presented in the previous chapter, illustrate lack of written documentation in plans, 
laws and regulations concerning the use of unorganized volunteers. Nevertheless, my 
informants in this study all gave the impression unorganized volunteers are being utilized in 
emergencies. This fact is reflected on by the respondents in the following way: 
I am not trained to utilize unorganized volunteers, I just do it. As police, you have to use common sense 
(Informant 2) 
 If an unorganized volunteer offer me practical help, of course I accept if I need it (Informant 2) 
 Crisis management is about improvising (Informant 3) 
We have to depend on public assistance. Sometimes we are only two men working together in a team 
(informant 1).  
Crises are unpredictable, and unforeseen things may occur. It is important we do not reject [unorganized 
volunteers] right away, but keep them in mind in case we need further resources (Informant 7).  
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The above statements exemplify how the respondents improvise in emergency response. The 
fact that unorganized volunteers are being utilized in emergencies, despite limited formal 
rules of action is due to informal practices. The emergency responders act in accordance to 
personal beliefs. The emergency responders interact with unorganized volunteers because 
they (emergency responders) consider appropriate to do it. Throughout the interview several 
respondents referred to examples where unorganized volunteers had been utilized in 
emergencies. Ironically none of the emergency respondent agencies were trained in such 
response, except from one respondent from the Red Cross organization who claimed she was 
trained (Informant 9). But when digging into what kind of education she had received I 
interpret her knowledge to be more or less based on informal exchange of experience, than of 
formal education/training. The informant claimed they had “table top” exercises, but the cases 
discussed were not planned for, nor written (Informant 9). The respondents’ utilization of 
unorganized volunteers was enabled by the actors’ ingenuity.  
 We are not trained [in utilizing unorganized volunteers]. I guess it is a result of experience (Informant 8) 
The coordination among emergency responders and unorganized volunteers on the scene, 
were characterized by use of “common sense” (Informant 2).  Moreover, the respondents were 
aware that they had to interpret, or “read” (Informant 6) potential unorganized volunteers and 
what could be reasonable tasks to delegate to them: 
You have to be sure when utilizing unorganized volunteers. If they turn their backs on, and hide [maybe 
they are not the right ones to use]. You have to read them (Informant 6) 
The above statement illustrate how improvisation may both facilitate and constraint 
interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. Nonetheless, 
improvisation is informal aspect based on personal experiences, and influence how 
emergency responders interact with unorganized volunteers.  
4.2.2 Internal discussions among colleagues   
Besides personal experiences and perceptions, internal discussions among colleagues are 
informal factors influencing interactions between emergency responders and unorganized 
volunteers. All six respondents (Informant 1-6) from professional emergency response 
organizations had positive experiences with unorganized volunteers. Either from own 
experience, or from stories told by colleagues:  
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We have heard stories were unorganized volunteers has been utilized, successfully 
(Informant 1) 
Also the organized volunteers from the Red Cross discussed internally the use of unorganized 
volunteers. These discussions usually take place after participating in actions where 
unorganized volunteers have been present (Informant 9). According to my informants the use 
of unorganized volunteers is a topic for discussion because there is increasing consciousness 
toward this group as a potential resource (Informant 7, 8 and 9). The organized Red Cross 
may discuss different scenarios where unorganized are present, and how they will cope with it 
(Informant 9). An informant from the Red Cross claimed they have been discussing the use of 
unorganized volunteers in management training (Informant 8). The need to pay attention 
towards unorganized volunteers is increasing: 
FORF
17
 has focused on the utilization of unorganized volunteers recently. They [FORF] have noticed a 
growing need to focus on unorganized volunteers, especially after search and rescue actions were 
crowds of people are showing up. There are some challenges related to this, and they [FORF] have 
started working on it (informant 7).  
The respondents from the Red Cross stressed how they discuss internally the challenge when 
coordinating unorganized volunteers, concerning vocabulary and the way they speak to each 
other (Informant 7, 9). Often, the organized Red Cross may use sardonic humour to cope with 
difficult situations (Informant 8, 9), but this is not appropriate when unorganized volunteers 
are present. The informants from the Red Cross stressed they discussed internally how to 
communicate with unorganized volunteers and which task would be appropriate to give 
unorganized volunteers in search and rescue operations (Informant 7, 8 and 9). The other 
emergency response organizations in the study did not discuss unorganized volunteers to the 
same extend as for the organized Red Cross. One of the informant from the police even 
stressed she didn`t remember if they had been ever discussing internally unorganized 
volunteers (Informant 2). Another informant from the police pointed they are discussing 
internally emergency situations where unorganized volunteers have been present (Informant 
1). Informants from the ambulance service and the fire and rescue emphasized they had heard 
stories told by colleagues where unorganized volunteers had been utilized successfully 
(Informant 3, 6). However, neither claimed they discussed unorganized volunteers with 
colleagues very often (Informant 3, 6).  
                                                          
17
 FORF stands for voluntary organizations rescue forum (Frivillige organisasjoners redningsfaglige 
forum)(Translation is done by the author). 
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Internal discussions among colleagues are informal means influencing the way emergency 
responders perceive unorganized volunteers. The organized Red Cross were the organization 
discussing the interaction with the average citizen to the greatest extend. Especially 
challenges concerning unorganized volunteers were discussed among the organized Red 
Cross (Informant 9). Moreover, stories were told were unorganized volunteers had been 
utilized successfully (Informant 1, 3, 4), all of which provide the emergency responders with 
informal practices made available in emergency situations.     
4.2.3 Challenges in the use of unorganized volunteers 
Though unorganized volunteers are considered by emergency responders as a blessing, they 
can also be a hindrance to professional rescuers. Among my informants, the latter is not a big 
problem. As far as people on the scene interfere it is easily coped with: 
As far as people [unorganized volunteers] on the site are a hindrance, we ask them to remove  
(Informant 2) 
 Hysterical people can be a hindrance, so we give them a task (Informant 3).  
Findings so far have demonstrated the capability of unorganized volunteers, and their 
willingness to assist both professionals and the organized Red Cross. However, all 
respondents expressed a number of challenges when utilizing unorganized volunteers. These 
include concern about the well fare of unorganized volunteers: 
Unorganized are not trained, how will they react to injured and wounded, or even dead people?  
(Informant 7) 
One respondent from the ambulance service claimed he could not know what state of mind 
unorganized volunteers are in (Informant 4). Whereas another respondent from the ambulance 
service stressed he could not know what to expect of unorganized volunteers (Informant 3). 
Respondents agreed they felt some sort of responsibility for unorganized volunteers: 
Once unorganized volunteers are included, you have a responsibility for them and their welfare (Informant 
6) 
The scene of emergencies may be overwhelming. We have no idea if unorganized volunteers are capable of 
coping with traumas and injuries. Sometimes we have to protect them [unorganized volunteers] from the 
sight of traumas (informant 7). 
All of the above challenges are related to informal constraints. The respondents’ beliefs and 
values concerning the welfare of the unorganized volunteers, uncertainty regarding mental 
conditions and the responsibility of including untrained may hamper the interaction between 
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emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. When facing an emergency situation these 
factors are informal aspect constraining emergency responders from utilizing unorganized 
volunteers.  
4.2.4 Summary of informal practices 
There are two primary issues related to informal aspect that are the drivers of the interaction 
between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. These are (1) personal 
experiences and perceptions and (2) internal discussions among colleagues. Personal 
experiences and perceptions are related to citizens` behavior in crisis, communication and 
improvisation. The emergency responders had a variety of experiences of how unorganized 
volunteers behave and act in emergencies. In general, people are calm and act rationally. 
However, the respondents also had experienced that unorganized volunteers turned their 
backs on, or behaved hysterically. Nonetheless, all of these experiences regarding citizens` 
behavior in crisis influence how emergency responders interact with unorganized volunteers, 
and which task they (emergency responders) perceive as appropriate to people willing to 
assist in emergencies. Communication is another issue related to personal experiences. The 
respondents approached unorganized volunteers in different ways concerning communication. 
The ways emergency responders speak to unorganized volunteers are based upon their 
personal beliefs of what is the most appropriate according to the situation they (emergency 
responders) are facing. Finally, regarding personal experiences and perceptions influencing 
interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers, improvisation is of 
upmost importance.  Especially the ambulance services emphasized the importance 
improvising in emergencies. Both the police, the fire and rescue services, ambulance services 
and the organized Red Cross utilizes unorganized volunteers “if needed”, regardless of 
lacking material practices. If emergency responders find it appropriate to utilize unorganized 
volunteers, the average citizen will indeed be used. The informal aspects by interaction 
constraining the use of unorganized volunteers are many. The emergency responders were 
uncertain how unorganized volunteers will react in real emergencies. The emergency 
responders also asked questions like: Are unorganized volunteers emotionally prepared?  
What agenda do they have? Meaning; are they participating for own curiosity, or worse, to 
sell pictures/information to the media. The professional emergency responders had a clear 
idea that in everyday life, coping with everyday emergencies, Tromsø has a wide range of 
emergency agencies and do not need further assistance. If they don’t need assistance, they 
don’t ask for it/accept offer. Yet, they realize that if large scale disaster strikes public 
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assistance is valuable and crucial. But many of my informants were unsure how unorganized 
volunteers will react to injured, wounded or even dead people. Furthermore, unorganized 
volunteers are a diffuse and uncertain group of people. Professional emergency responders 
claim they do not know who will be present in emergency or what skills they have. These 
above findings are all informal obstacles for the utilization of unorganized volunteers. 
What stands out as the most prominent reason unorganized volunteers are being utilized in 
emergencies, despite lack of formal facilitators, is personal experience and perceptions. Both 
professional emergency responders and the organized Red Cross have heard stories told by 
colleagues where unorganized volunteers where utilized successfully. Research, in addition to 
emergency responders own experience, shows people are first on the site; they keep calm and 
provide emergency aid (Informant 3, 4, 7, 8, 9). The organized Red Cross was the informants 
that discussed internally to the greatest extend how unorganized volunteers best can be 
utilized on the site of emergencies. This may be interpreted both as a facilitator and constraint. 
It may be a facilitator in that respect that the overall impressions of the experience with 
unorganized volunteers were positive. The informal constraint is discussed in the above 
section. All respondents had a clear understanding of what tasks could easily be delegated to 










Figure 2. Interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers 
Interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers is guided by the 
institutional logics within their organization. Figure 2 illustrate an overview of formal and 
informal aspects, both facilitating and constraining interaction between emergency responders 















Facilitator: see table I Constraints: see table II 
Informal aspects 
Facilitator: see table III Contraints: see table IV 
44 
 























Formal rules of action facilitating interaction between emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers:  
Regulatory framework 
Formal rules of action constraining interaction between emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers:  
Lack of access to inter-com 
Unorganized volunteers are not paid 
Unorganized volunteers have no insurance 
Lack of knowledge of emergency situations and use of emergency equipment 
The contingency plans for the Red Cross organization for search and rescue 
actions  
Not familiar with emergency procedures 
Unorganized volunteers are not included in contingency plans, training 
procedures or the HSE requirements  
Sufficient professional emergency responders 
Informal aspects facilitating interaction between emergency responders 
and unorganized volunteers:  
The emergency responders` personal experience 
Stories told by colleagues 
Citizens behaviour in emergencies 
Lack of professional emergency responders on the site 
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To sum up, professional emergency responders have no written plans on how to interact or 
utilize unorganized volunteers. Nor do they train in how to use this group. Nevertheless, 
findings illustrate that unorganized volunteers are utilized in emergency, as a result of 
informal practices, and improvisation in particular. The interaction between professional 
emergency responders and unorganized volunteers is not random. Actors in an organization 
are guided by formal and informal aspects.  
Institutional logics consist of underlying structures that legitimate the actors’ choice of 
behavior. Formal logics are observable, such as laws, rules and contingency plans. Informal 
logics are more diffuse, referring to culture and values. The following chapter will discuss the 
findings.  
  
Informal rules of action constraining interaction between emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers:  
Citizens behaviour in emergencies 
Uncertainty regarding the unorganized volunteers motive for participating in 
emergency response 
The unorganized volunteers mental state of mind 




The aim of this chapter is to discuss the empirical data collected, based on the analytical 
framework of the study.   
Disasters create uncertain environments for organizations. Emergencies are difficult to predict 
(Perry 2004, Perry and Lindell 2003), and thus the environment creates special demands on 
the emergency responders. Consequently, crisis management is about decision making under 
high degree of uncertainty (Aven 2010). Emergency responders are the boundary spanners of 
their organizations. Organizations will have to interact and adapt to the environment to 
survive, and perform their functions (Duncan 1972). The study exemplifies how emergency 
response organizations operate in complex, dynamic environment and how emergency 
responders interact with unorganized volunteers. Moreover, the study emphasizes how 
responses are contingent on the emergency situation and resources available. Boundary 
spanning activities is a crucial activity to ensure the efficiency of response operations.  
However, the thesis highlights the lack of material practices (formal rules of action) when 
interacting with unorganized volunteers. Besides, the study has identified a series of 
challenges related to the utilization of unorganized volunteers. 
Friedland and Alford (1991) stressed that individuals in organizations rely on logics to guide 
their everyday interactions and provide them with meaning and motive to lead behavior. Such 
institutional logics provide individuals with the conciseness of self; their values and interests, 
providing meaning and facilitating purposive action (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). As such, 
logics provide rules for social behavior and criteria by which some things are possible and 
some are not. Individuals and organizations follow rules they perceive as appropriate to the 
situation they are facing. The results from the previous chapter demonstrate that the 
institutional logics of the agencies studied are both formal and informal. Formal logics refer to 
structures and practices, informal logics speak of values, beliefs and perception (Thornton et 
al, 2012). Some of the formal logics constraints, and some facilitate, interaction between 
emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. The same principles apply for informal 
logics.  
Professional emergency responders interact with unorganized volunteers on the scene. The 
environment of crisis is unique and may be chaotic and unpredictable. However, the 
interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers is not random. When 
professional emergency responders and organized Red Cross arrive at the site of an 
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emergency they allocate attention towards unorganized volunteers according to different 
institutional logics. Whether or not it is appropriate to utilize unorganized volunteers depends 
on institutional logics within the organization. Some of these are formal, some are informal.  
The respondents from the study all had a clear understanding of the priority of their tasks 
when arriving at the site of emergencies. The police have the overall command at the scene. 
They are organizing the emergency response, but also investigating the event in case of 
criminal acts. The fire and rescue are in charge of the situation in the absence of the police. 
But their primary concern is to extinguish fire and secure the area. The ambulance services 
prioritize lifesaving activities and take care of injured people on the site. The organized Red 
Cross (and other organized volunteers) is participating in the emergency response only upon 
command from the police. They are trained to handle crisis, have firs aid knowledge and 
know the routines and tasks of the professional emergency responders present (through large 
scale exercises). Emergency responders act in accordance to formal rules of action.  Laws, 
procedures, contingency plans and training are all formal rules of actions guiding the 
emergency responders in emergencies. The police are trained in organizing the scene of 
emergencies. Through regularly training and exercises they practice on different scenarios 
that may occur in emergencies. The police legislation emphasizes the responsibility of the 
police in emergency situations. The contingency plan, part 1 for the police highlights the tasks 
that are to be performed by the police at the scene. Plans and exercises are formed according 
to laws and duties. Unorganized volunteers are not part of any of the formal rules of action 
held by the police. The fire and rescue services, on the other hand, have one formal rule of 
action facilitating the use of unorganized volunteers. The law of fire and explosion protection 
emphasizes how citizens may be utilized in accidents, if the fire and rescue team commander 
demand to.  However, this is nothing they train for, nor is it written in contingency plans or 
procedures. The formal rules of action facilitating for the use of unorganized volunteers held 
by the fire and rescue services are limited to the five sentences in the Law of fire and 
explosion. The formal actions constraining the fire and rescue services are thus more. Both 
respondents from the fire and rescue service claimed training for utilizing unorganized 
volunteers could be a good idea. However, lack of money, time and resources seem to be the 
main reason they did not train in how to best utilize unorganized volunteers. Also challenges 
concerning HSE were mentioned.  
The different agencies studied have different institutional logics providing their actors with 
“rules of action”. This means they will approach unorganized volunteers in different ways. 
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The informants from the Red Cross were the emergency response agency that had the 
strongest awareness of unorganized volunteers. According to the informants from the Red 
Cross, unorganized volunteers had to be organized somehow to utilize them to the best of 
their ability. The Red Cross experienced a growing need to focus on the interaction between 
emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. In order to accommodate such need, they 
prepared to strengthen the formal practices in terms of developing contingency plans. The fire 
and rescue services were the only emergency response agency having the interaction between 
unorganized volunteers enshrined in law. They were aware of the possibility to utilize 
unorganized volunteers in emergencies. However, the organization lacks both plans and 
procedures on how to utilize unorganized volunteers. Also, the respondents from the fire and 
rescue services were trained to prioritize extinguishing of fire and keeping people safe.  As 
such, their formal practices constraint them from utilizing unorganized volunteers. Neither the 
police had formal practices on how to interact or utilize unorganized volunteers. Nevertheless, 
they were fully aware the possibility to do so in case the situation required. This latter 
example demonstrates that the values and beliefs of the police may facilitate for utilizing 
unorganized volunteers. The ambulance services were the respondents who experienced 
emergencies most frequent. The procedural handbook held by the actors facilitated using 
unorganized volunteers if needed. The respondents were conscious of the notion of 
improvisation as an important aspect with crisis management. This was demonstrated indeed 
in examples given by the informants.  
The findings of the study highlight a lack of formal practices among professional emergency 
responders regarding interaction with unorganized volunteers. There are limited descriptions 
of how to utilize unorganized volunteers in emergencies (Brannvernloven, Checklist for 
search and rescue response). The organized Red Cross has checklists regarding search and 
rescue. However, the Red Cross is most likely not present in the “golden hour” of crisis, nor 
are the checklist suitable for situations other than search and rescue.  
As highlighted in theory, informal practices may serve as a supplementary if formal 
procedures fall short (Sydnes 2011). As such, formal procedures and informal practices are 
intertwined (Sydnes 2011, Thornton et al. 2012). The reason unorganized volunteers are being 
utilized in emergencies, despite lack of formal practices, is mainly due to informal aspects, 
held by the actors within the emergency response organizations. Informal aspects are shaped 
through personal experiences with unorganized volunteers and discussions among colleagues 
regarding use of unorganized volunteers. The average citizen is considered to behave 
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reasonable in crisis and act rationally. Moreover, the respondents communicated with 
unorganized volunteers in different ways. Communication is guided by perceptions held by 
emergency responders and what they conceive as appropriate. As noted before, improvisation 
is crucial in dynamic and complex environment. The respondents claimed unorganized 
volunteers were utilized in emergencies, due to improvisation. Stories told by colleges where 
unorganized volunteers were utilized successfully, are also factors that guide emergency 
responders when interacting with unorganized volunteers.  
In sum, the actors within emergency organizations are guided by formal and informal aspects. 
Some of these factors constraint and some facilitate interaction between emergency 
responders and unorganized volunteers. These “rules of action” provide the actors with a 
framework to be used when interacting with unorganized volunteers on the scene. Whether or 
not unorganized volunteers are used is a matter of appropriateness. The institutional logics 
anchoring the organization allocate the attention of the actors interacting with unorganized 
volunteers. The actors’ framework consists of laws, regulations, training, values and beliefs. 
All of which provide the emergency responders a cognitive understanding of whether or not it 
is appropriate to utilize unorganized volunteers in the situation they are facing. Findings 
illustrate that the emergency resource need in Tromsø are well covered, at least when it comes 
to small scale “everyday” emergencies. However, if disaster strikes, the informants claimed 






This study has addressed two research questions. The first questions inquired into how 
emergency response organizations interact with unorganized volunteers through formal and 
informal means. As noted in theory, society and social relations are not just about the 
circulation of material structures, but also about culture and symbolic (Thornton et al 2012). 
Formal logics are specific and observable and provide rules and regulations written in plans 
and laws. Informal logics refer to values and perceptions held by the actors within 
organizations (Thornton and Ocasio 2008). However, formal rules and informal practises are 
intertwined (Sydnes 2011). Formal procedures mainly connect roles and functions but not 
individuals (Selznick 1948 sited by Sydnes 2011). Informal aspects may serve as a 
supplemental aspect where formal organizational structures fall short (Sydnes 2011). 
I conclude that emergency responders have limited formal practices on how to interact with 
unorganized volunteers. The interaction between emergency responders and unorganized 
volunteers are driven by informal practices. These are personal experiences and internal 
discussions among colleagues.  
The second research question concerned what factors facilitate and constraint interaction 
between professional emergency responders and unorganized volunteers. As noted by Glynn 
and Raffaeli (2013) the choice of actions made by actors in an organization are not free and 
independent. Rather, choices and interaction are influenced by institutional logics which 
either facilitate or constrain organizational action (ibid). My findings illustrate a number of 
factors both facilitating and constraining interaction between emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers. These factors are related both to formal and informal aspects. (See 
Figure 2, Table I-IV). Based on the findings, it is interesting to explore if it is possible to build 
on facilitators in order to utilize unorganized volunteers to the best of their capacity.  
6.1 Contribution 
If disaster strikes, people who are nearby will most likely contribute in the emergency 
response. Professional emergency responders and organized volunteers will have to interact 
and cooperate with unorganized volunteers. Little attention has been paid to explore how 
unorganized volunteers can be included in contingency plans in order to utilize them to the 
best of their ability.  More information about the interaction between unorganized volunteers 
and emergency responders on the site would help us to establish more knowledge on this 
matter. As there is a lack of knowledge in disaster and emergency response literature on how 
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to utilize unorganized volunteers, my thesis has intended to contribute with knowledge in this 
field. 
6.2 Practical implications 
Crises are unpredictable and undesirable. Training for emergencies is a crucial element in 
emergency preparedness. In this respect, crisis management is a test of the quality of plans 
and training (Perry 2004). Emergency preparedness involves planning, training and written 
plans (Perry and Lindell 2003). Plans are a living document that needs to adapt to constant 
changes (Perry and Lindell 2003). Findings from the study illustrate there is a change in 
attentiveness toward unorganized volunteers. The informants from the Red Cross organization 
claim there is need to focus on unorganized volunteers, and also develop a system to organize 
the average citizen in emergencies.  
The practical implication in this study is to strengthen the “material practises” in order to 
utilize unorganized volunteers in the best possible way.  First of all, unorganized volunteers 
have to be regarded as a resource. Once acknowledged, the average citizen should be included 
in emergency planning. As emergencies are unpredictable, my informants claimed training on 
specific unorganized volunteers is a challenge. “You never know who is present”. However, 
Perry and Lindell (2003) stresses contingency plans to specific are impossible, and should 
rather focus on “principles of response”. Hence, mapping the skills and knowledge of 
unorganized volunteers may be a principle in emergency response.  
Second, preparing for crisis requires training and exercises. There are mainly three types of 
exercises: table top-, functional- and full scale exercises (Perry 2004). Considering 
unorganized volunteers, they may be included in a number of ways. In table top exercise 
members of an emergency organization discuss different possible scenarios. Emergency 
responders may visualise that unorganized volunteers are present in the emergency situation 
and picture what tasks could possibly be delegated to them. In this way they have at least 
thought through the possibility to use unorganized volunteers. This also applies for the 
functional exercise.  
Third, when it comes to full scale exercises emergency responders have the opportunity to 
practise on utilizing unorganized volunteers. Markers are usually given the mission to play 
injured, and not capable to assist emergency responders. However, in real life, unorganized 
volunteers are the one to save lives and participating in the golden hour of an emergency 
situation (Kruke 2012, Auf der Heide 2004, Helseloot and Ruitenberg 2004). Markers must be 
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briefed on the actual behaviour of people in crisis, similarly for the emergency responders. In 
this matter the interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers are 
based on accurate assumptions of the behaviour of people, instead of false (Dynes 1990).  
Fortunately catastrophes are rare. However, if disaster strikes all resources must be mapped 
and utilized to the best of their ability. Hence, unorganized volunteers may be crucial in this 
respect and contribute improving organizational resilience in emergencies.   
6.3 Issues for further research 
Given the result of this study I will finally give recommendations for further research. As my 
study is limited to Tromsø, a similar study from other communities with less professional 
emergency response resources available would provide more information about the 
interaction between emergency responders and unorganized volunteers.  Also, conducting a 
table-top or functional exercise with focus on utilizing unorganized volunteers, prior a full-
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Appendix: Interview guide 
 
Title: Emergencies and the use of unorganized volunteers 
Research questions: 
How do emergency response organizations interact with unorganized volunteers through 
formal and informal means? 
What factors facilitate and constraint interaction between emergency responders and 
unorganized volunteers? 
PERSONLIGE SPØRSMÅL 
1. Hvor mange år har du jobbet i politiet/brann/ambulanse? 
2. Hvor mange års erfaring har du fra krisehåndtering? 
3. Alder/ kjønn 
 
UORGANISERTE FRIVILLIGE / BEFOLKNINGENS ATFERD 
4. Hvordan tror du befolkningen vil oppføre seg i en krisesituasjon? Hvorfor? 
5. Har du eksempler på type atferd? 
6. Har du erfaring med uorganiserte frivillige i krisesituasjoner? Eventuelt Hvilke? 
7. Tenker du om denne gruppen som en hjelp eller et hinder i en krisesituasjon? Hvorfor?  
8. Om folk på stedet blir satt til å utføre praktiske oppgaver, tror du de er i stand til det? 
Hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke.  
9. Hvilke oppgaver kunne vært hensiktsmessig å delegere til folk/ uorganiserte frivillige 
på stedet?  
10. Tror du man kan utnytte denne ressursen enda mer? Evn hvordan? 
 
BEREDSKAPSPLANER 
11. Beskrive Beredskapsplanene deres uorganiserte frivillige, hvorfor/ hvorfor ikke tror du 
det? 
12. Hvis dere kommer til et skadested, og uorganiserte frivillige allerede er i gang med å 








14. I storøvelser trener dere sammen med sivilforsvaret, røde kors og andre frivillige 
organisasjoner. I praksis vet vi at de har en responstid som ofte er langt større enn det 
det trenes med, hva tenker du om det?  
15. Barents Rescue/andre øvelser: Hvordan benyttet dere de uorganiserte frivillige?  
16. Er det mulig å trene på bruk av uorganiserte frivillige? 
 
Er det mulig å ta kontakt med deg om jeg ønsker flere opplysninger? Eventuelt på mail. 
 
 
 
